I. Introduction.
Recently there has been renewed interest in how greater jurisdictional fragmentation within US metropolitan areas impacts the delivery of services and the distribution of tax burdens within "Tiebout" type competition. Strumpf [ ] This paper extends the latter group of papers by developing a full Nash Equilibrium model of local law enforcement effort and criminal flows. Local jurisdictions expend funds to increase arrests which in turn reduce local criminal activity. The effectiveness of arrests on reducing local activity is a central determinant of the expenditure decision. A total pool of regional criminals -that are not incarcerateddistributes itself across jurisdictions to achieve a common level of "utility". Local arrest effort thus both reduces the local share of this pool (by reducing criminal "utility") as well as reducing the regional pool with a typical "incarceration" impact. Within this framework, "smaller" jurisdictions have less incarceration impact on the regional pool, but greater "deflection" effect on the share of the pool operating in their jurisdiction. The magnitude of these two effects determines whether "smaller" jurisdictions face more or less incentive to expend effort.
Empirically, the paper develops an extensive cross section data base for 250 MSA in 1997 -a year in which all local law enforcement agencies are surveyed. Included is data on MSA criminal activity, the number of agencies and their effort levels (wages and expenditure). Since the number of agencies has changed little between (5-year) surveys, the paper takes the view that fragmentation is largely "historic" and hence exogenous with respect to criminal activity. Using a wide range of reduced form equations, it turns out that MSA's with a larger number of agencies clearly spend less in aggregate on law enforcement effort. Surprisingly, such MSAs also have less crime. These results withstand numerous empirical specifications.
These results are inconsistent with the model developed wherein fragmentation impacts the demand for law enforcement effort, which then has the expected impact on aggregate criminal activity. Rather, the results are more consistent with the type of argument presented by Hoxby in which fragmentation somehow increases the efficiency of an agency which then reduces the need (and demand) for resources.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections II through IV develop the model and its predictions about the impact of metropolitan fragmentation. Section V describes the data and presents a series of reduced form results. Section VI uses a range of instrument "assignments" to estimate a structural model which confirms the reduced form estimates.
Section VII concludes which some suggestions about how to interpret the empirical results. Towns or their agents, select an arrest rate, to maximize the simple utility function (1), which yields the first order condition (2).
where:
For convexity it is generally assumed that U'' 1i <0 and U'' 2i <0 (increasing marginal disutility of crime). This yields an upward sloping schedule between criminal activity and law enforcement effort -at the town level -conditional on the "effectiveness" of arrests on reducing crime dc i /da i . As a consequence of convexity, a greater derivative dc i /da i will lead the town to spend more and increase arrests.
With each town using the marginal condition (2), we get a system of N "demand"
equations that are conditioned on the values of dc i /da i . To complete the system, we need to specify the criminal flow equations and then from them derive the "effectiveness"
derivatives.
The MSA has a total pool of potential criminals which is C and we assume that this pool is fixed (there is no inducement into crime). Following Leavitt [ ] these criminals are either incarcerated or committing crimes. When arrested, criminals serve a common MSA level sentence length of L. In equilibrium, there is a steady state flow condition between incarceration releases and arrests -aggregated across towns. This is expression (3) below.
Following Helsley and Strange [ ] we assume that the movement of criminals across towns is perfectly elastic with respect to the net returns (or utility) that they obtain from such activity. The net returns to crime committed in each town V will depend negatively on that town's arrest rate and on its criminal density (Freeman-Grogge-
. With perfect criminal mobility, the returns to crime must be equal across towns:
V' 1i = ∂V/∂a i < 0, V' 2i = ∂V/∂c i < 0 Equation (3) when combined with the set of N equations (4) determines the spatial pattern of crime (c i ) and criminal returns V* -given the spatial pattern of arrests a i . The ratio V' 1i / V' 2i determines how many fewer criminals will operate in a town as that town increases its arrest effort -to keep the returns to crime fixed.
In order to close the system we need to specify how levels of c i and a i determine the derivative dc i /da i .
III. Determination town arrest effectiveness: dc i /da i .
We assume that each town understands the criminal flow equations (3) and (4) and plays a Nash game, that is assumes that other town's efforts a k are fixed as it adjusts a i and determines its own effectiveness. Totally differentiating (3) and (4) with respect to a i we get the equations in (5):
On the left hand of (6), the summation term is negative and so dividing through reverses all signs on the right hand side. On the right hand side, the first term is negative and represents the "incarceration" effect. By reducing the total pool of criminals increased arrests in one town increase criminal utility because MSA wide criminal density is reduced. The second term on the RHS is positive (hence its impact on V* is negative) and it represents a "deflection" effect. By increasing arrests, a town "scares" criminals to other towns. In those towns, where arrests are fixed, the deflection effect tends to increase criminal density and hence reduce V*.
If V' 1i /V' 2i is "large" (positive) then there is much "deflection" of criminals to other towns when town (i) expands effort. This makes it likely that dV*/da i <0 and this implies dc k /da i > 0. On the other hand if V' 1i /V' 2i is "small" then there is little "deflection" of criminals to other towns when town (i) expands effort, and in this case the incarceration effect dominates with dV*/da i >0, and dc k /da i < 0.
Combining (5) and (6) we solve for dc i /da i and get (7) below:
The left hand side summation term is positive, and on the right hand side, both terms are negative. Hence dc i /da i is always signed negative as one would expect.
IV. Impact of town size on the arrest effectiveness.
To better understand the role of town size we can suppose there are two towns:
"our" town 1 and "others" 2. From (7) this simplification produces:
Now as h 1 goes to zero, dc 1 /da 1 approaches the deflection term (V' 11 / V' 21 ) since a "tiny" town has no effect on metropolitan wide incarceration. At the other extreme as h 2 approaches zero, dc 1 /da 1 equals the incarceration term -c 1 L/(1+ a 1 L) since deflection away from a very "large" town becomes effectively impossible.
In equilibrium we assume Nash symmetry and this simplification implies: c n = c, h n = h = H/N, a n = a, V' 2n = V' 2 . With this the equations in (5) reduce to those in (9)
Clearly as N increases, the magnitude of dV*/da i and dc k /da i is reduced, whatever its sign is and N does not impact that sign. On the other hand, as N increases, dc i /da i can become smaller or larger. Upon further differentiation we get:
In (10) if the deflection effect is large, then greater metropolitan fragmentation (a larger N) increases the negative value of town arrest effectiveness and hence town arrest effort will increase. Effectively, a large number of small town are encouraged to spend more because they "think" they are solving crime by "scaring" away criminals! Conversely, if the deflection effect is nil then with a larger N, a smaller incarceration effect reduces effectiveness and town arrest effort will diminish. Here, a large number of small towns get "discouraged" because their increased effort seems to do nothing for aggregate crime.
The empirical implications of the model are quite straightforward. If the deflection effect (V' 1 / V' 2 ) is large, then in an MSA with many smaller jurisdictions, each should face a larger value for dc i /da i, and hence spend more on law enforcement effort.
On the other hand if the deflection effect (V' 1 / V' 2 ) is nil, then in an MSA with many smaller jurisdictions, each should face a smaller value for dc i /da i, and hence spend less on law enforcement effort.
In this model, the impact of MSA structure on spending should effectively identify the magnitude of the deflection versus incarceration effect. Presumably MSA crime rates move inversely to aggregate crime effort with respect to the number of jurisdictions (ceteris paribus).
V. Empirical results: Data.
1). FBI uniform crime reports for 253 MSAs: violent and property crime per capita year 1997.
2). LEAA enforcement agency "Census" 1997. A "complete" survey of expenditures made by all law enforcement agencies (19,000). Agencies with fewer than 5 employees were not included in the survey. When aggregated to MSA level, State police were excluded and only county and local police or sheriffs were tallied. 3). Other MSA level covariates.
A. Reduced Form Equations.

Dependent Variable AVEPOLICE -Estimation by Least Squares
Usable Observations 237 Degrees of Freedom 232 Total Observations 238 Skipped/Missing 1 Centered R**2 0.425918 R Bar **2 0.416020 Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat ************************************************************* T-Stat ****************************************************************** T-Stat ************************************************************* 1. Constant -5. T-Stat ************************************************************ 1. T-Stat ********************************************************** 1. Constant 1.576e-002 1. T-Stat ************************************************************ 1. T-Stat ****************************************************************** T-Stat ****************************************************************** 1. Constant 5. (Berman, et. al.) . But in their model there is no criminal mobility and neighborhoods each have their own innate differences in "crime". c). Could be that small jurisdictions are more efficient and that this "shift" in the criminal supply schedule leads towns to spend less.
